these reforms, potentially providing evidence of the convergence hypothesis at work.
Nonetheless, there are several factors which challenge such a straight-forward regulatory picture. In spite of the existence of common themes in the international post-scandal reforms, significant differences emerged in terms of focus, structure and regulatory detail.
Some of the common law post-Enron reforms are interesting from the perspective of what they did not, rather than what they did, address. Thus, for example, there is an interesting dichotomy between strengthening of shareholder participatory rights versus protection of shareholder interests evident in the reforms.
Strengthening of shareholder participatory rights was a significant theme in the Australian and the UK reforms, but not in the US reforms. The shape of these reforms has also affected subsequent corporate law debates in the US, UK and Australia that address quite different policy concerns.
Scholars have noted that, even where similar motivations underpin various reforms, it is unlikely that their long-term effects will coincide. 6 Another aspect of this long-term regulatory unpredictability is the impact of backlash, recently
The convergence and 'law matters' hypotheses have been challenged from a range of perspectives. Some commentators, while accepting the strong homogenising influences of globalisation, challenged the view that convergence would be a continuous and steady process. 17 Indeed, it has been argued that the very concept of 'convergence' is ambiguous, in that it is sometimes unclear whether it relates to form or substance. 18 Other commentators disputed the presumed link between transplantation and efficiency gains, warning that transplantation may disrupt the internal balance and consistency of a regulatory system, creating a newly minted, but now dysfunctional, governance system. 19 Also, the intended consequences of regulation are often subverted by the underlying social environment. 20 Finally, the methodology and background assumptions in the 'law matters' study have been criticised. One strand of criticism focuses on the broad generalisations underlying the 'law matters' hypothesis, some scholars arguing that the presumed differences between civil law and common law systems adopted by many convergence theorists are too sharply defined and often inaccurate. 21 On the other hand, regulatory differences that sometimes exist between common law countries are simply obscured or ignored. 22 29 and governance changes by self-regulatory organisations. 30 At one level, the corporate law reforms addressed similar governance concerns, particularly with respect to gatekeeper conflicts of interest, 31 and potentially provided more evidence of the convergence hypothesis at work. 32 Although similar concerns and motivations prompted the reforms, there are several matters that challenge such an ordered regulatory picture and highlight significant differences between the various regulatory responses.
First, in spite of globalising influences, many of the reforms responded specifically to local issues. In the US, Sarbanes-Oxley closely tracked the contours of Enron. 33 Local issues were also prominent in UK reforms 34 49 Rules are also often reactive and thereby subject to over-or underinclusion, while standards avoid this problem by conferring greater discretion on the decision-maker. 50 It has been argued that there is a decline in the ability of rules to provide certainty, commensurate with an increase in the complexity of the matter regulated. 51 In many situations, however, the line between rules and principles may be somewhat blurred, with regulation comprising hybrids of the two.
The dynamics and interplay between rules and principles have become more complex due to greater fragmentation and internalisation of contemporary corporate governance practices. 52 Principles and norms, embodied in self-regulatory codes of corporate governance, 53 have become an increasingly important regulatory tool. As in the case of legal rules, enforcement of self-regulatory codes is obviously an important issue, and one that will vary depending on the relevant legal and social culture.
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The international scandals resulted in a hardening of norms in both Australia and the UK. There has also been a global trend for stock exchanges to be more following public pressure and criticism about its credibility as a regulatory body, the
ASX introduced its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations ('ASX corporate governance principles'), 55 which adopted a UKstyle 'comply or explain' 56 regulatory model that was more stringent than the previous disclosure requirement in Australia.
57
Corporate governance norms were also enhanced in the United Kingdom as a result of the Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors. 58 The
Higgs Report recommended strengthening the independence of the board from management within the pre-existing 'comply or explain' regulatory framework, and these recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the UK Combined Code.
Traditionally, the development of self-regulatory codes has tended to be either a response to the lack of specific governmental regulation in particular areas, or, in some cases, a justification for the absence of such regulation. A number of the postscandal reforms in Australia and the UK fall into the latter category. They also reflect a strong preference for the flexibility offered via regulation by principles rather than mandatory legal rules, and recognition that inadequate enforcement of good governance practices could result in the imposition of onerous government regulation. In contrast to the reforms in Australia and the UK, the US reforms appear to reflect the process of 'juridification', 60 in their conspicuous shift towards a rulesbased approach to corporate governance with a higher level of mandatory governance standards. The final NYSE corporate governance rules, for example, introduced a range of mandatory requirements concerning board structure to reflect generally accepted best practice in corporate governance, 61 the substance of which is often stricter than its counterparts in other jurisdictions, such as Australia. 62 The SarbanesOxley also imposed many new prescriptive rules, thereby affecting the balance of regulatory power between the states and federal law. However, not all of the reforms under the Sarbanes-Oxley are of this ilk. Sections 406 and 407 respectively direct the SEC to issue rules requiring a company to disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers (and if not, why not), and whether at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert (and if not, why not). While these provisions are framed as disclosure provisions only, they have been described as 'disguised substance', the likely contextual effect of which will be to mandate compliance. 63 The Sarbanes-Oxley has been depicted as creating a 'shadow corporation law', 64 and criticised for deviating from the traditional US model of corporate law, under which state-based law is viewed as facilitative and competitive. 65 The 92 it is an image that underlies many of the post-scandal reforms in common law countries. However, the reforms differ in the manner in which they seek to achieve the goal of enhanced managerial accountability vis-à-vis 86 Cunningham, above n 85, 13-20. 87 shareholders. Specifically, there is an intriguing dichotomy between strengthening of shareholder participatory rights versus protection of shareholder interests.
Strengthening shareholder participatory rights in corporate governance was an explicit governance objective in the Australian reforms. 93 The Explanatory
Memorandum to the CLERP 9 Act contains numerous references to the desirability of increasing shareholder activism 94 and improving shareholder participation and influence in the companies in which they invest. 95 A clear example of this is in the reforms relating to executive remuneration. 96 The CLERP 9 Act permits greater shareholder participation in remuneration issues by requiring shareholders of a listed company to pass an advisory resolution at the annual general meeting approving the directors' remuneration report. 97 Although non-binding, the explicit goals of the procedure are to provide shareholders with greater voice in relation to remuneration issues, 98 and encourage greater consultation and information flow concerning remuneration policies between directors and shareholders. 99 The reform also seeks to constrain excessive compensation by 'shaming' and censure, and from this perspective may be a potentially powerful governance mechanism. 100 Nonetheless, the Australian government's professed enthusiasm for shareholder activism is not unqualified, and in one particular respect, the government has attempted to restrict shareholder participation in corporate governance. This is in relation to the so-called '100 member rule', which permits 100 shareholders to convene a general meeting of the company. 101 The rule, which is remarkably generous to shareholders compared to many other jurisdictions, has attracted criticism as being open to possible abuse by activist shareholders with a social agenda. 102 In 2005, the federal government announced that it intended to remove the 100 member rule, 103 however its proposal to this effect was rejected by state leaders at a meeting of the Ministerial Council for Corporations in July 2006. 104 Increased shareholder participation and influence was a theme in the UK reforms (which included a version of the non-binding shareholder vote on the directors' remuneration report) 105 and the UK government has issued strong rhetoric about the need to encourage greater shareholder democracy and activism. 106 This policy goal was also reflected in the UK Combined Code, which included recommendations of the Higgs Report specifically aimed at strengthening the position of both institutional investors and independent directors, through a range of techniques designed to establish a close relationship between the two groups. 107 The UK Combined Code stressed the need for the board to communicate with investors generally and to encourage their participation in the annual general meeting.
The US reforms present an interesting contrast in this regard. Protection of shareholder interests was a clear priority 109 Another potentially forgotten element in the US reforms was the issue of executive compensation. Executive compensation was deeply implicated in Enron and other corporate scandals. Conflicts of interest were evident in the structure of many executive compensation packages, which, rather than aligning managerial and shareholder interests, often appeared to create perverse incentives for executives to manage earnings and share price to enhance the value of options and pursue shortterm goals. 113 Indeed, this misalignment of interests in executive pay is one possible interpretation of the corporate collapses. 114 Yet, in spite of its prominence in the scandals, executive compensation received virtually no attention in the US reforms. Thus, for example, the lacuna in the US reforms concerning shareholder participation rights has had a clear influence on the direction of subsequent academic debate on the need to enhance shareholder power in the US. Bebchuk, a leading proponent of increased shareholder power and participation, has identified two key areas of corporate governance need. First, he has argued strongly for the reform of US proxy rules to allow shareholders greater influence over the director nomination process, 120 a reform for which the SEC originally exhibited some enthusiasm.
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Bebchuk's second set of reform proposals focuses on increasing shareholder power, by permitting shareholders to initiate and effect changes to the corporate charter.
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These reform proposals would significantly alter the current balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors in the US. It is, as yet, unclear how much traction the proposals will ultimately gain. when it would be at the expense of managerial autonomy and power. 125 In addition, the SEC's reformatory zeal concerning the director nomination process has waned. 126 However, the issues raised by this academic debate are now undeniably in the US corporate ether. One example of this attitudinal shift is in relation to the issue of executive compensation. In spite of the surprising lack of attention given to executive compensation in the 2002 US reforms, regulatory momentum on this issue has gathered pace since that time. In early 2006, the SEC announced that it would conduct a significant overhaul of its disclosure rules on executive compensation 127 and political rhetoric on the topic of excessive executive pay has recently intensified. 128 Activist investors, such as the AFSCME, 129 submitted shareholder proposals seeking an advisory vote on executive pay comparable to the non-binding shareholder vote introduced in the Australian and UK post-scandal reforms. Proposals to this effect were successful at some companies, such as Blockbuster and Verizon
Communications, during the 2007 proxy season. 130 The issue of an advisory vote for shareholders on executive remuneration also become the subject of Democratinstigated congressional consideration. 131 In provides an interesting contrast to current policy concerns in Australia and the UK, which are strongly focused not on shareholder rights, but on the interests of stakeholders.
The plight of stakeholders, such as employees, and corporate responsibility generally, were major themes of the corporate scandals. 150 Nonetheless, the Sarbanes-protection of shareholders and their interests. 151 In the UK, however, 'a third way', advocating a long-term, enlightened shareholder value approach to corporate governance issues, was already gaining momentum. 152 Political issues, including concern by the EU to harmonise the laws of member states, contributed to this development in the UK.
153
. This enlightened shareholder value principle has been given legislative force under s 172 of the recently enacted UK Companies Act 2006, which imposes a new duty on directors to 'promote the success of the company', requiring them to consider stakeholder interests and the long-term effects of their decisions. 154 Corporate social responsibility has also become a major issue in Australia, largely as a result of two high-profile local corporate scandals. The first was the James Hardie saga. This involved a corporate reconstruction whereby asbestos-related liabilities were separated from other assets in the company through the creation of a foundation, 155 which was subsequently found to have insufficient funds to meet legitimate compensation claims. 156 The second concerned the Australian Wheat Board Ltd, one of the world's largest wheat marketing and management companies, which was found to have made corrupt payments to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program.
These scandals were responsible for generating not only heated public debate about corporate social responsibility, but also two governmental reports on the topic -and Markets Advisory Committee ('CAMAC Report').
158
A central issue in these reports was the scope of directors' duties, and the extent to which the current Australian legal framework permits directors to consider the interests of stakeholders or the broader community. This issue arose directly from the James Hardie matter, where James Hardie executives and directors sought to justify their conduct by arguing that current law essentially required them to privilege
shareholder interests 'at all costs'. 159 The PJC Report observed, however, that 'rampant corporate irresponsibility certainly decreases shareholder value'. amendment to directors' duties, 162 on the basis that it was overly prescriptive and would result in confusion, while the CAMAC Report considered that a comparable statutory amendment in Australia would provide 'no worthwhile benefit'. 163 Overall, there is a degree of overlap between the tone and ultimate conclusions of the PJC based regulation and initiatives, rather than formal legislative change, to address corporate social responsibility issues. The CAMAC Report, in particular, acknowledged the limits to the law's ability to control corporate decision-making by prescription, portraying corporate responsibility as a fluid part of a company's operations, not a legislative 'add-on'. 
